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Abstract: 
 
Up until the 1970s, Greece was a paradigm of a vigorous economy with high growth rates, 
positive budgets and low borrowing. Even when the international economy experienced a 
recession in the 1970s on account of the oil crisis, the Greek economy continued to grow. In 
the 1980s an imprudent fiscal policy mix (involving higher pensions, higher salaries to civil 
servants, early retirements, overcrowding the civil service and loss-making state-owned 
enterprises trough new hires, etc.) produced large deficits which, in turn, lead to increased 
borrowing as the economy’s growth rate slowed down. The rest of the story is pretty much 
known. As the country’s creditworthiness declined it became harder to obtain the funds 
needed and Greece turned to its lenders of last resort (IMF, EU and ECD), referred to as the 
troika. Harsh steps were taken, which involved wage and pension cuts, which, in turn, 
adversely affected consumption, making the recession inevitable. It is a problem with a 
straightforward solution: Increase exports and investments. In this paper we demonstrate the 
beneficial impact of these two variables, exports and investments, on the economy, and 
present alternative scenarios regarding the evolution of these factors and their impact on the 
GDP. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Up until the 1970s, Greece was a paradigm of a vigorous economy: Growth rates 
were high (5-8%), borrowing was low (less than 20% of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), government budgets run either at a surplus or at small deficit. Even when the 
international economy experienced a recession in the 1970s on account of the oil 
crisis, the Greek economy continued to grow (with the exception of 1974, a year 
marked by political instability and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus). It was by and 
large for these high growth rates that Greece was accepted in the European 
Economic Union.  
 
In the 1980s an imprudent fiscal policy mix (involving higher pensions, higher 
salaries to civil servants, early retirements, overcrowding the civil service and loss-
making state-owned enterprises trough new hires, etc.) produced large deficits 
which, in turn, lead to increased borrowing (reaching 120% of the GDP by the mid-
1990s) as the economy’s growth rate slowed down. Between 1995 and 2007, 
attempts were made to reverse the situation. The relative improvement in a number 
of areas and economic indicators allowed Greece to enter the Eurozone in 2002 
(Thalassinos, Liapis 2013; Thalassinos et al., 2007; Thalassinos et al., 2012).  
 
However, to the extent that growth depended almost exclusively on consumption 
(over 90%), the situation was not sustainable. The advent of the international 
financial and economic crises in 2008-9 lead things to a head: consumption 
plummeted, incomes (output) and state revenues followed, deficit borrowing rose, 
and the debt-to-GDP ratio escalated.  
 
The rest of the story is pretty much known. As the country’s creditworthiness 
declined it became harder and to obtain the funds needed. So Greece turned to its 
lenders of last resort, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union 
(EU) and the European Central Bank (ECD), frequently referred to as the troika. To 
secure the bailout package, Greece had to guarantee (via a memorandum of 
understanding) to become again a reliable borrower. That is, to gradually bring the 
deficit down and return to surplus, for it is only then that borrowing will stop. So, 
harsh steps were taken, steps that any technocrat would recommend. They involved 
wage and pension cuts, which, in turn, adversely affected consumption, making the 
recession inevitable. To recap: Our consumption-based economy was not viable.  
 
While fueling growth for a long time, it also fed the deficit. Now that borrowing is 
cut, for no one lends us money just to spend it on consumption, consumption is 
shrinking, so GDP is shrinking too. Consequently, we are faced with a recession.  
 
It is a problem with a straightforward solution: Increase exports and investments. 
Both are GDP components. Investments in particular, beyond positively affecting 
exports, may also stimulate consumption (which lately relied on borrowing).  
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The combined effect ought to bring us back to a sustainable growth path. Back in the 
1970s, when we had a vigorous economy, investments were more than half of 
consumption; in 2009 a mere one sixth of it. 
 
In the pages that follow we will demonstrate the beneficial impact of these two 
variables, exports and investments, on the economy, and present alternative 
scenarios regarding the evolution of these factors and their impact on the GDP. 
 
2. The fundamental variables of the Greek economy: 1950 - 2014 
 
Charts 1, 2 and 3 track the evolution of real GDP, as well as the government’s debt 
and deficit compared to the GDP. The healthy economic outlook of the period 1960-
1980, was succeeded by a drastic deterioration running from 1980 to our days. Note 
that while the GDP increased almost six fold during 1950-1980, in the course of 
1980-2014 it merely rose by less than one half: 47% to be exact (Chart 1).  
 
At the same time, the debt raised ten fold in terms of constant prices and the debt-to-
GDP ratio almost eight fold (Chart 2). The government surpluses and minor deficits 
of the 1960s and 1970s -minor in relation to the GDP- were followed by ever 
increasing deficits compared to the GDP, often reaching one fifth the size of the 
GDP (Chart 3).  
 
A correction was attempted from 1995 onwards, by keeping the debt and deficit at 
relatively low levels. The debt’s parity with the GDP was maintained as long as 
GDP kept increasing (its growth rate averaged 4.2% during 2000-2007). 
Nevertheless, the policy was not sound.  As mentioned in the Introduction, it relied 
almost entirely on domestic private and public consumption. So when consumption 
decreased due to the advent of the international economic and financial crisis in 
2008, and, especially in 2009, tax revenues collapsed, borrowing resumed, the 
deficit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios escalated.  
 
Accordingly, creditworthiness declined as it made little market sense to lend a 
society so that it may go on consuming. Thus the bailout from the IMF, EU and ECB 
came. We now move on to discuss the reasons the recession was unavoidable, and 
how the economy may return to a growth path. 
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Chart 1. Real GDP and growth rates, 1950 - 2014 
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Chart 2. General Government Debt (% GDP), 1950 – 2014 
9%10%11%10%8% 9%9% 8%7%8% 9%9%
11%12%12%
14%16%
17%19%19%
20%19%18%
20%21%21%
24%24%23%24%
29%
32%
34%
39%
44%45%
52%
57%
61%
68%
75%
82%
109%
116%
114%
118%
115%
113%
106%106%107%105%
102%
99%100%
102%
107%
113%
129%
148%
170%
157%
175%
178%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
110%
120%
130%
140%
150%
160%
170%
180%
5
1
5
2
5
3
5
4
5
5
5
6
5
7
5
8
5
9
6
0
6
1
6
2
6
3
6
4
6
5
6
6
6
7
6
8
6
9
7
0
7
1
7
2
7
3
7
4
7
5
7
6
7
7
7
8
7
9
8
0
8
1
8
2
8
3
8
4
8
5
8
6
8
7
8
8
8
9
9
0
9
1
9
2
9
3
9
4
9
5
9
6
9
7
9
8
9
9
0
0
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
4
%
 G
D
P
 
 
 
  J. Chalikias 
 
71 
Chart 3. General Government Deficit (% GDP), 1960 – 2014 
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3. The GDP components and their contribution to growth  
 
The GDP expression which sums up the economy’s expenditures serves as the point 
of departure:   
GDP = Domestic consumption + Investments + Exports – Imports.  
 
The first three components have a positive effect and the fourth a negative effect. As 
a result, the larger the investments and exports are the brighter the economy’s GDP 
prospects in terms of maintaining positive growth rates.  
 
Next we consider two instances regarding the Greek economy. The Chart 4 tells the 
story of the economy’s fall. Up through the mid-1970s the economy’s structure was 
not only viable, but also showed signs of steady improvement as investments 
gradually increased to about 40% of GDP at the expense of consumption. The latter 
was confined to slightly above 70% of GDP, which suggests that investment was 
more than half the share of consumption. By 2009 the situation had changed: was the  
exact opposite. Investments were low, just 16% of GDP, while consumption had 
grown at 95 % of GDP. I.e., investments were only one sixth of consumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Greek Economy: 1950 - 2014: The 30 Year Road Leading to the Greek Financial Crisis and 
the IMF-EU-ECB Bail-Out: Investments and Exports Are the Way Out 
72 
Chart 4a. GDP structure of GDP, 1975 and 2009, example of a non- viable 
economy, Investments account for 1/6 of consumption 
 
 
Chart 4b. GDP structure of GDP, 1975 and 2009, example of a viable economy,  
investments account for over half the consumption 
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Let us examine GDP changes in 1976 and 2010, respectively. In 1975 the economy 
grew by 6.5%, while in 2010 it shrunk by 4.5%. Tables 1A and 1B show the 
contribution of the four components in overall GDP growth (the contribution of each 
component is obtained by multiplying its GDP weight times its rate of change). 
Thus, we may attribute the (a) 1976-GDP growth of 10,2% to a (7.3% x 72.2% =) 
5.3% increase in consumption, a (8.6% x 38% =) 3.3% increase in investment, a 
(10.3% x 15.9% =) 1.6% increase in exports, and a (14.1% x -26.1%=) -3.7%, i.e., a 
decrease, due to enlarged  imports; and (b) 2010-GDP contraction to a (-4.9% x 
94.6% =) -4.6% change in consumption, a (-12.2% x 16.1% =) -2% change in 
investment, a (3.8 x 18,9% =) 0.7% increase in exports, and a (-4.7% x -29.6% =) 
1.4% increase due to a decline in imports.  
 
Apparently, the recession may be explained by the drop in consumption which, by 
2009, amounted to 95% of GDP. Likewise, in 2011 the recession was about 7.1%, 
by and large (i.e., 6.6%) associated with a further reduction in consumption (by 
7.2%), with consumption amounting to 91.7% of GDP. The continued decline in 
investment by 16.4% multiplied by its weight (17.7%) added another -2.9% to the 
recession, countered in part by small positive effects associated with exports (a mere 
0.1% due to reduced exports of services) and imports (2.3% due to a decline in 
imports). Again, all these show how vulnerable our economy is and why, under the 
circumstances, the downturn which occurred was inevitable. 
 
Table 1A. GDP composition (%) 1975 - 1976 
 
 
GDP Components 
 
1975 Composition  
Component 
change in 1976 
Impact of 
constituent 
components  
  (% of GDP) (%)  
Consumption 72.2% 7.3% 5.3% 
Investments 38.0% 8.6% 3.3% 
Exports 15.9% 10.3% 1.6% 
 - Goods 9.4% 8.7% 0.8% 
 - Services 6.5% 12.5% 0.8% 
Imports -26.1% 14.1% -3.7% 
 - Goods -21.6% 13.2% -2.9% 
 - Services -4.5% 18.2% -0.8% 
GDP 100.0%   +6.5% 
 
Table 1B: GDP composition (%) 2009 - 2010 
 
GDP Components 
 
2009 Composition  
Component 
change in 2010 
Impact of 
constituent 
components  
  (% of GDP) (%)  
CONSUMPTION 94.6% -4.9% -4.6% 
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INVESTMENTS 16.1% -12.2% -2.0% 
EXPORTS 18.9% 3.8% 0.7% 
 - GOODS 7.9% 4.9% 0.4% 
 - SERVICES 11.0% 3.1% 0.3% 
IMPORTS -29.6% -4.7% 1.4% 
 - GOODS -24.2% -8.3% 2.0% 
 - SERVICES -5.4% 11.0% -0.6% 
GDP 100.0%   -4.5% 
 
4. The preconditions for returning to economic growth  
 
The obvious way to return to a growth path is to raise the contribution of exports and 
investments in the GDP, i.e. to return to the economic structure we had in the past. If 
and only if these two GDP components grow will GDP figures improve? Indeed, 
beyond facilitating exports, investments stimulate consumption, which, up until 
recently relied on borrowing.  
 
Table 2 traces the impact on GDP of hypothetical changes in the four components, 
initially under the assumption that the GDP is structured as per its 2010-2012 
average.  
 
Consider the first scenario: Consumption continues to decrease, say, by 5%, and 
imports by 2.6%, while exports increase by 6.5% on account of the encouraging 
performance of the exported goods and the recent tourist season, and investments by 
10% on account the of  privatizations and the attraction of new investors. (A 10% 
increase from a starting point of €32 billion amounts to approximately € 3.2 billion, 
and corresponds to 18% of the nominal GDP which currently stands at  nearly € 180 
billion). In this manner the economy contracts by 0.4%.   
 
The second scenario is more optimistic: Consumption decreases by 4% (that is a 
smaller negative effect than before), and imports by 1.6% (a smaller positive effect), 
while exports increase by 10% and investments by 8%. In this case the economy 
expands by 0.5%. 
 
The third scenario presumes a much healthier initial GDP structure. Investments rise 
to account for 25% of GDP, consumption falls to account for 83% of GDP, while the 
other two components remain the same. In this case the economy expands by 1.5%. 
The above show that the transition from economic recession to recovery requires a 
restructure in which investments and exports increase at the expense of 
consumption. Understandably, a stable investment environment and the 
implementation of reforms which are long overdue (namely, a stable tax system, the 
modernization of the social security and labor system, improving public services and 
the infrastructure, etc.) in order to attract investments is required. 
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Table 2: Scenarios of GDP component evolution (%) 
 
Example 1    
    
GDP Components 
 
Current  
Composition  
Hypothetical 
component 
change  
Impact of 
constituent 
components  
  (% of GDP) (%)  
CONSUMPTION 90.0% -5.0% -4.5% 
INVESTMENTS 18.0% 10.0% 1.8% 
EXPORTS 23.0% 6.5% 1.5% 
 - GOODS 12.0% 7.0% 0.8% 
 - SERVICES 11.0% 6.0% 0.7% 
IMPORTS -31.0% -2.6% 0.8% 
 - GOODS -25.0% -3.0% 0.8% 
 - SERVICES -6.0% -1.0% 0.1% 
GDP 100.0%   -0.4% 
    
Example 2    
    
GDP 
COMPONENTS 
Current  
Composition  
Hypothetical 
component 
change  
Impact of 
constituent 
components  
  (% of GDP) (%)  
CONSUMPTION 90.0% -4.0% -3.6% 
INVESTMENTS 18.0% 10.0% 1.8% 
EXPORTS 23.0% 8.0% 1.8% 
 - GOODS 12.0% 8.0% 1.0% 
 - SERVICES 11.0% 8.0% 0.9% 
IMPORTS -31.0% -1.6% 0.5% 
 - GOODS -25.0% -2.0% 0.5% 
 - SERVICES -6.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
GDP 100.0%   0.5% 
    
Example 3    
(if investments reach 25% of GDP) 
    
GDP 
COMPONENTS 
Current  
Composition  
Hypothetical 
component 
change  
Impact of 
constituent 
components  
  (% of GDP) (%)  
CONSUMPTION 83.0% -4.0% -3.3% 
INVESTMENTS 25.0% 10.0% 2.5% 
EXPORTS 23.0% 8.0% 1.8% 
 - GOODS 12.0% 8.0% 1.0% 
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 - SERVICES 11.0% 8.0% 0.9% 
IMPORTS -31.0% -1.6% 0.5% 
 - GOODS -25.0% -2.0% 0.5% 
 - SERVICES -6.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
GDP 100.0%   1.5% 
 
5. Recent and projected evolutions 
 
As a confirmation of what has been said in the previous paragraph, let us see what 
happened in the previous year 2014. Table 3A shows the GDP component evolution 
in 2014 according to the provisional data of National Accounts. There was a growth 
of +0.7% caused by a slight decrease in consumption (-0.2%), a noticeable increase 
in investment (+9.9%), an increase in exports (+7.5%) and an increase in imports 
(+7.7%). As a result the positive effects of increased investments and exports 
(+3.4%) exceeded the negative effects from the decline in consumption and the 
increase in imports (-2.7%). 
 
As regards 2015, the picture is still unclear. The latest available national accounts 
data are for the first half and only the foreign trade data are available for the first 
eleven months. Therefore, the estimated GDP components changes for 2015 are: 
consumption and imports decline by -4% and -8.6%, respectively, mainly due to 
capital controls. Exports show an improvement by +1.8 % (exports of goods 
decreased by -5 % due to the drop in fuel prices, while exports of services grew by 
6%). Finally, it is estimated that investments will decline by -8% due to political 
instability. These estimates suggest that in 2015 the GDP declined about -1 % (Table 
3B), and show once more the significant effect of investments and exports. 
 
For the coming year 2016 our projections are: Consumption and imports will 
continue to decline due to capital controls. Exports of goods and services will follow 
approximately the same trend, while investment will increase mainly due to the 
ongoing privatization and the restarting of large projects. With these assumptions, 
GDP will grow about 1 % (Table 3C). 
 
Table 3: Recent and projected GDP component evolutions (%) 
Table 3A: GDP composition (%) 2013 – 2014 
 
GDP Components 
 
Current  
Composition  
Realized 
component 
change  
Impact of 
constituent 
components  
  (% of GDP) (%)  
CONSUMPTION 91.3% -0.2% -0.2% 
INVESTMENTS 11.5% 9.9% 1.1% 
EXPORTS 30.6% 7.5% 2.3% 
 - GOODS 16.0% 6.9% 1.1% 
 - SERVICES 14.6% 8.2% 1.2% 
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IMPORTS -33.4% 7.7% -2.6% 
 - GOODS -26.6% 8.4% -2.2% 
 - SERVICES -6.8% 5.0% -0.3% 
GDP 100.0%   +0.7% 
 
Table 3B: GDP composition (%) 2014 - 2015 (estimation) 
 
GDP 
COMPONENTS 
Current  
Composition  
Estimated 
component 
change  
Impact of 
constituent 
components  
  (% of GDP) (%)  
CONSUMPTION 90.5% -4.0% -3.6% 
INVESTMENTS 12.5% -8.0% -1.0% 
EXPORTS 32.7% 1.8% 0.6% 
 - GOODS 15.5% -5.0% -0.8% 
 - SERVICES 17.2% 8.0% 1.4% 
IMPORTS -35.7% -8.6% 3.1% 
 - GOODS -28.7% -9.5% 2.7% 
 - SERVICES -7.0% -5.0% 0.4% 
GDP 100.0%   -0.9% 
 
Table 3C: GDP composition (%) 2015 - 2016 (projection) 
 
GDP 
COMPONENTS 
Current  
Composition  
Projected 
component 
change  
Impact of 
constituent 
components  
  (% of GDP) (%)  
CONSUMPTION 90.5% -3.0% -2.7% 
INVESTMENTS 12.5% 5.0% 0.6% 
EXPORTS 32.7% 1.8% 0.6% 
 - GOODS 15.5% -5.0% -0.8% 
 - SERVICES 17.2% 8.0% 1.4% 
IMPORTS -35.7% -6.6% 2.4% 
 - GOODS -28.7% -7.0% 2.0% 
 - SERVICES -7.0% -5.0% 0.4% 
GDP 100.0%   0.9% 
Sources : Hellenic Statistical Authority, http://www.statistics.gr, Bank of Greece, 
http://www.bankofgreece.gr/, Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Boosting investments and exports is the only way to bring the country’s economy 
back on a growth path. To that end, regarding exports, a comprehensive, long-term 
strategic plan aiming to promote high quality products and products of high added 
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value to overseas markets is needed. The broad lines of action for the promotion of 
products of significant importance are the following: 
 
Industrial products: Greece has improved both export performance and presence in 
international markets in both ttechnology and high-skill-intensive manufactured 
goods. The presence of a highly educated labor force proficient in new technologies 
favors the establishment and operation of businesses with such orientation. Thus, a 
strategy which provides incentives for investing in these sectors will further improve 
the country’s position. 
 
Agricultural products: Greece is a major supplier of many commodities and has a 
significant presence in foreign markets. Yet, this extrovert position should be 
strengthened in additional markets and products of high added value. Here, too, we 
need to adopt strategies and business plans aiming to increase the exports of branded 
and certified products as opposed to products sold in bulk (olive oil, vegetables, 
quality wines, dairy products, aromatic and medicinal plants, etc.), and improve the 
shares of domestically produced goods in international markets in which shares are 
low (especially in the markets which exhibit dynamism) and enter and actively 
pursue the markets of rapidly developing nations. 
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